What Drives Sell-Side Analyst Compensation at High-Status Investment Banks?
What Drives Sell-Side Analyst Compensation at High-Status Investment Banks?
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1475-679x.2011.00417.x
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发表时间：
2011-03
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Boris Groysberg;P. Healy;David A. Maber
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Boris Groysberg;P. Healy;David A. Maber
我们使用主要投资银行的专有数据来调查与分析师年度薪酬相关的因素。我们发现薪酬与“全明星”认可度、投资银行贡献、分析师投资组合的规模以及分析师是否被《华尔街日报》认定为最佳选股者呈正相关。我们没有发现任何证据表明薪酬与盈利预测的准确性有关。但与之前的研究一致，我们发现分析师的流动率与预测准确性相关，这表明分析师的预测激励主要是基于终止的。其他分析表明，买方客户对分析师研究质量进行投票的“全明星”认可代理用于在银行和分析师之间分配佣金。总体而言，我们的证据与分析师薪酬旨在奖励增加经纪和投资银行收入的行为是一致的。为了评估我们研究结果的普遍性，我们使用第二家高地位银行的薪酬数据测试了相同的关系，并获得了类似的结果。
We use proprietary data from a major investment bank to investigate factors associated with analysts’ annual compensation. We find compensation to be positively related to "All-Star" recognition, investment-banking contributions, the size of analysts’ portfolios, and whether an analyst is identified as a top stock-picker by the Wall Street Journal. We find no evidence that compensation is related to earnings forecast accuracy. But consistent with prior studies, we find analyst turnover to be related to forecast accuracy, suggesting that analyst forecasting incentives are primarily termination-based. Additional analyses indicate that "All-Star" recognition proxies for buy-side client votes on analyst research quality used to allocate commissions across banks and analysts. Taken as a whole, our evidence is consistent with analyst compensation being designed to reward actions that increase brokerage and investment-banking revenues. To assess the generality of our findings, we test the same relations using compensation data from a second high-status bank and obtain similar results.