Uncertainty in Mechanism Design
Uncertainty in Mechanism Design
复制标题
机构设计的不确定性
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.3774581
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发表时间：
2021
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Chris Shannon
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Giuseppe Lopomo;Luca Rigotti;Chris Shannon
我们考虑的机制设计问题，用不完全的偏好形式化，在Bewley（1986）。在不完备的情况下，决策取决于一组信念，当且仅当一个行动对这组信念具有更大的预期效用时，它才比另一个行动更受欢迎。我们认为两个自然的概念，激励相容性在这种情况下：最大的激励相容性要求，没有策略有更大的预期效用比如实报告的所有信念，而最佳的激励相容性要求如实报告有更大的预期效用比所有其他策略的所有信念。在一个模型中，连续的类型，我们表明，最佳的激励相容性是相当一般的条件下的信念事后激励相容性。在一个离散型空间模型中，我们刻画了从私人信息中提取租金的特征。我们表明，充分提取一般是可能的最大的激励兼容机制，但需要足够的分歧类型，既不持有也不失败一般，最佳的激励兼容机制。
We consider mechanism design problems with Knightian uncertainty formalized using incomplete preferences, as in Bewley (1986). Without completeness, decision making depends on a set of beliefs, and an action is preferred to another if and only if it has larger expected utility for all beliefs in this set. We consider two natural notions of incentive compatibility in this setting: maximal incentive compatibility requires that no strategy has larger expected utility than reporting truthfully for all beliefs, while optimal incentive compatibility requires that reporting truthfully has larger expected utility than all other strategies for all beliefs. In a model with a continuum of types, we show that optimal incentive compatibility is equivalent to ex-post incentive compatibility under fairly general conditions on beliefs. In a model with a discrete type space, we characterize full extraction of rents generated from private information. We show that full extraction is generically possible with maximal incentive compatible mechanisms, but requires sufficient disagreement across types, which neither holds nor fails generically, with optimal incentive compatible mechanisms.