The Role of Conceptual Entities and Their Symbols in Building Advanced Mathematical Concepts
The Role of Conceptual Entities and Their Symbols in Building Advanced Mathematical Concepts
复制标题
概念实体及其符号在构建高级数学概念中的作用
DOI:
10.1007/0-306-47203-1_6
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发表时间:
2002
影响因子:
2.8
通讯作者:
J. Kaput
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
G. Harel;J. Kaput
Mathematical thinking is carried out using mental objects. For example, suppose one asks if a vector space Vand its double dual V** are isomorphic. At one level, one is asking about the “objects” Vand V** and, to begin describing an isomorphism, one may go on to describe a correspondence between respective vectors in the two spaces, which again, are treated mentally as objects, although they might be n-tuples or matrices, for example. Similarly, one may need to define a mapping between two function spaces, where the elements of the domain and range of the mapping must be treated cognitively as objects, as opposed to the mapping itself, which may be treated as a process, with inputs and outputs. In yet another instance, one may need to reinterpret a universal construction in the sense of MacLane (1971) as an adjoint functor pair, where the existence of a unique mapping with a certain property in fact defines a natural transformation between functors–so the mapping must play the role of an object on which the natural transformation acts. Such experiences are quite common in mathematics at all levels, but they feature widely throughout advanced mathematical thinking. The aim of this chapter is to begin to discuss them and their roles in helping us to build ever more complex mathematical concepts. The idea of conceptual entities formation was suggested by Piaget (1977) in his distinction between form and content. Recently, several researchers have recognized its value in the learning of mathematics. It has been called encapsulation (Ayers, Davis, Dubinsky & Lewin, 1988), reification (Sfard, 1989), integration operation (Steffe & Cobb, 1988), for example, this process is an instance of reflective abstraction (Beth & Piaget, 1966), in which “a physical or mental action is reconstructed and reorganized on a higher plane of thought and so comes to be understood be the knower”(p. 247). Greeno (1983) defines a conceptual entity as a cognitive object for which the mental system has procedures that can take that object as an argument, as an input. He distinguishes cognitive objects from attributes, operations and relations, which attach to or act on objects. Further, he suggests that to qualify as objects, they must be permanently available in the individual’s mental representation (p. 277).The construction of function as a conceptual entity is an example of the entitication process (Thompson, 1985a; Harel, 1985; Ayers et al, 1988). One level of understanding the concept of function is to think of a function as a process associating elements in a domain with elements in a range. This level of understanding may be sufficient to deal with certain situations, such as interpreting graphs of functions point-wise or solving for x in an equation of the form f (x)= b, but it would notbe sufficient to deal meaningfully with situations which involve certain operators on functions, such as the integral and differential operators, as we will see later in this chapter. For the latter situations, the three components of function–the rule, the domain, and the range–must be encapsulated into a single conceptual entity so