Private Entrepreneurs In Public Services: A Longitudinal Examination Of Outsourcing and Statization Of Prisons
Private Entrepreneurs In Public Services: A Longitudinal Examination Of Outsourcing and Statization Of Prisons
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公共服务中的私营企业家：监狱外包和国家化的纵向考察
DOI：
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
P. Azevedo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Sandro Cabral;S. Lazzarini;P. Azevedo
有些人担心，私营企业家追求利润最大化的取向与提供复杂公共服务的预期社会目标相冲突。公认的契约理论主张，私人参与公共服务将导致以牺牲质量为代价的成本降低。使用监狱作为我们的经验背景下，我们受益于一个事件，涉及在巴西的惩教设施的外包和随后的国家化。定量和定性信息之间的三角测量，我们没有发现外包监狱质量恶化的证据，并建议推动这一结果的一个关键机制是公共监督员与私营企业家在混合治理方式中密切合作。然后，我们提供了一套新的主张，超越危险的考虑，研究如何异质的公共和私人能力的组合可能产生学习和溢出效应无法通过纯粹的政府管理或全面的私有化。版权所有© 2013战略管理协会。
Some fear that the profit-maximizing orientation of private entrepreneurs conflicts with societal goals expected in the provision of complex public services. Received contractual theories advocate that private involvement in public services will result in cost reductions at the expense of quality. Using prisons as our empirical context, we benefit from an event involving the outsourcing and subsequent statization of correctional facilities in Brazil. Triangulating between quantitative and qualitative information, we do not find evidence of quality deterioration in outsourced prisons and suggest that a key mechanism driving this result is the presence of public supervisors closely working on-site with private entrepreneurs in a hybrid governance fashion. We then deliver a set of new propositions that move beyond hazard considerations to examine how the combination of heterogeneous public and private capabilities might yield learning and spillover effects unattainable through pure government management or full-fledged privatization. Copyright © 2013 Strategic Management Society.