Axiomatic Theory of Bargaining with a Variable Number of Agents
Axiomatic Theory of Bargaining with a Variable Number of Agents
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与可变数量的代理人讨价还价的公理理论
DOI：
10.1017/cbo9780511664489.002
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发表时间：
1989
影响因子：
2.5
通讯作者：
T. Lensberg
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
W. Thomson;T. Lensberg
在本书中，汤姆森教授和伦斯伯格教授根据纳什（1950）对讨价还价问题的处理进行了推断，以考虑讨价还价者数量可能变化的情况。作者制定了公理来指定解决方案应如何响应此类变化，并提供所有主要解决方案的新特征以及这些解决方案的概括。本书还包含了在不同数量的代理背景下解决方案的其他几项比较研究。许多讨价还价的理论都可以在这种背景下重写。经典理论核心的三种解决方案的卓越性得到了证实。这些是纳什（1950）提出的解决方案和 20 世纪 70 年代公理化的两个解决方案（Kalai-Smorodinsky 和平等主义解决方案）。
In this book, Professor Thomson and Professor Lensberg extrapolate upon the Nash (1950) treatment of the bargaining problem to consider the situation where the number of bargainers may vary. The authors formulate axioms to specify how solutions should respond to such changes, and provide new characterizations of all the major solutions as well as generalizations of these solutions. The book also contains several other comparative studies of solutions in the context of a variable number of agents. Much of the theory of bargaining can be rewritten within this context. The pre-eminence of the three solutions at the core of the classical theory is confirmed. These are the solutions introducted by Nash (1950) and two solutions axiomatized in the 1970s (Kalai-Smorodinsky and egalitarian solutions).