Ownership Structure and Insider Trading: Evidence from China
Ownership Structure and Insider Trading: Evidence from China
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2506449
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发表时间：
2014-10
影响因子：
6.1
通讯作者：
Qing He;Oliver M. Rui
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Qing He;Oliver M. Rui
摘要本文考察了中国内幕交易的信息含量，并分析了股权结构如何影响市场对这些交易的反应。我们发现，内部人购买的累积异常收益率（CAR）是第一大股东持股比例的凸函数。此外，当第一大股东是政府相关者或第一大股东的控制权超过其现金流权时，内部人购买的CAR较低。我们还发现，对于由四大审计师审计的公司，市场对内部人士购买的反应更为积极。然而，我们没有发现一个所有权结构和市场反应之间的关系显着内幕交易。我们的研究结果是非常强大的替代模型规格，企业内部人士的身份，以及最近的公司新闻发布的价格敏感的事件。最后，我们表明，市场反应内部人购买的公司不太严重的征用，捕捉到的使用其他应收款。
Abstract In this paper, we examine the information content of insider transactions in China and analyze how ownership structures shape market reaction to these transactions. We find that the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) to insider purchases is a convex function of the percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder. Further, the CAR to insider purchases is lower when the largest shareholder is government-related, or when the control rights of the largest shareholder exceed its cash flow rights. We also find that the market reaction to insider purchases is more positive for firms audited by Big4 auditors. However, we do not find a significant relationship between an ownership structure and the market reaction to insider sales. Our results are remarkably robust to alternative model specifications, corporate insider identities, and recent corporate news releases on price-sensitive events. Finally, we show that market reaction to insider purchases is larger for firms with less severe expropriations, as captured by the use of other receivables.