Electoral accountability and incumbency
Electoral accountability and incumbency
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选举问责和任职
DOI：
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发表时间：
1989
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Banks
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
D. Austen;J. Banks
本书的当代政治理论样本一般借鉴了理性选择范式，特别是博弈论，并揭示了几个事实。首先，博弈论的应用范围超出了那些游戏的适应熟悉的介绍性文本囚犯的困境，鸡，和简单的多数规则投票游戏。第二，虽然通常使用数学工具的研究领域是选举和立法机构，但国际关系现在是一个特别肥沃的调查领域。最后，由于这些贡献涉及选举，立法程序和国际关系，我们将当代理论视为一个综合学科。具体的模型可能会采用不同的假设结构的战略互动，但博弈论的逻辑是一个线程，把他们都。
This volume's sample of contemporary political theory draws on the rational choice paradigm in general and game theory in particular, and reveals several facts. First, applications of game theory extend beyond the adaptations of those games made familiar by introductory texts—Prisoner's Dilemma, Chicken, and simple majority-rule voting games. Second, although the usual domain of research employing the mathematical tools has been elections and legislatures, international relations is now an especially fertile area of inquiry. Finally, because the contributions treat elections, legislative processes, and international relations, we see contemporary theory as an integrated subject. Specific models may employ different assumptions about the structure of strategic interaction, but the logic of game theory is a thread that unites them all.