Policy in a Two-Sector Efficiency Wage Model: Substituting Good Jobs for Bad
Policy in a Two-Sector Efficiency Wage Model: Substituting Good Jobs for Bad
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两部门效率工资模型中的政策：用好工作代替坏工作
DOI：
10.1080/01603477.1998.11490163
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发表时间：
1998
影响因子：
1
通讯作者：
T. Carter
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
T. Carter
用于研究效率工资效应的模型通常只假设一个效率工资支付部门（见Drago，1989-90，和Parkin，1996，本刊的例子）。然而，有几个重要的影响只出现在多部门模型中。例如，本文发现，对低工资部门征税会通过增加高工资工作岗位的数量来增加经济中的工作岗位数量。好工作取代坏工作，同时总就业率上升。其他提高成本的政策也有同样的效果。最低工资法和就业保障法的结果类似，但不完全相同。上述结果与通常的劳动力市场理论不一致，在该理论中，工资被驱动到平等。那么，考虑导致劳动力转移到高工资部门的政策就没有什么意义了。然而，政策可以用好工作取代坏工作的结果并不新鲜。关于英国贸易委员会制度的工资政策的影响，赫瑟林顿（Hetherington，1938）写道：“许多只能靠支付血汗工资维持生存的企业已经被迫倒闭。但是，总的来说，它们已经被更有效率的单位所取代，这些单位能够支持更高的工资。工资增加了，就业没有减少。
Models used to study the effects of efficiency wages usually assume only one efficiency wage-paying sector (see Drago, 1989-90, and Parkin, 1996, for examples in this journal). Yet there are several important effects that only appear in multisector models. For instance, this paper finds that a tax in the low-wage sector leads to an increase in the number of jobs in the economy by raising the number of high-wage jobs. Good jobs replace bad, while total employment rises. Other cost-raising policies have identical effects. Similar, but not identical, results hold for minimum wage laws and employment security laws. The above results are inconsistent with the usual labor market theory in which wages are driven into equality. Then, it makes little sense to think of policies causing shifts of labor into the high-wage sector. Yet the result that policies can substitute good jobs for bad is not new. Regarding the effects of the wage policies of the British Trade Board System, Hetherington (1938) wrote, Many businesses which could maintain themselves only by the payment of sweated wages have been forced out of existence. But, on the whole, they have been replaced by more efficient units which have been able to support the higher wages. Wages have risen; employment has not diminished.