Multi-Level Coordination and Decision-Making in Service Operations
Multi-Level Coordination and Decision-Making in Service Operations
复制标题
服务运营的多层次协调与决策
DOI：
10.1287/serv.1.4.270
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发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
2.3
通讯作者：
Andrew Henry
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Christian Wernz;Andrew Henry
服务操作中的决策是复杂的，因为它们涉及不同层次上的各种相互依赖的决策者（代理），从客户代表到客户经理再到高层管理人员。我们将一个三级维修服务问题作为一个随机决策模型，每一级都有一个客户经理、主管和工人。所提出的激励机制使下层代理人的利益与上层代理人的目标保持一致。本文从博弈论的角度分析了代理之间的策略互动，结果表明，给定一定的组织属性，可以达到帕累托有效纳什均衡。此外，我们证明了局部信息对于组织范围内的最优决策是足够的。在最后一步，将三层模型推广到多层次，即多组织规模的系统。[服务科学，ISSN 2164-3962（印刷），ISSN 2164-3970（在线），2009 - 2011年由服务科学全球（SSG）出版，ISBN 978-1-4276-2090-3。]
Decisions in service operations are complex since they involve various interdependent decision-makers (agents) at different hierarchical levels, ranging from customer representatives over account managers to top executives. We formulate a three-level maintenance service problem as a stochastic decision-making model, with an account manager, supervisor, and worker at each of the three levels. The proposed incentive mechanism aligns the interests of lower level agents with the goals of the top agent. The agents' strategic interactions are analyzed game-theoretically and results show that a Pareto-efficient Nash equilibrium can be attained given certain organizational properties. Furthermore, we show that local information can be sufficient for organization-wide optimal decisions. In a final step, the three-level model is generalized for multi-level, i.e., multi-organizational-scale, systems. [ Service Science , ISSN 2164-3962 (print), ISSN 2164-3970 (online), was published by Services Science Global (SSG) from 2009 to 2011 as issues under ISBN 978-1-4276-2090-3.]