Scientific Realism: Between Platonism and Nominalism
Scientific Realism: Between Platonism and Nominalism
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DOI：
10.1086/656825
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发表时间：
2010-12-01
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
Psillos, Stathis
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Psillos, Stathis
在本文中，我讨论了唯名论科学实在论（NSR）的前景，并表明它在许多方面是失败的。在第2节中，我讨论了NSR起飞所需的条件。在第3节中，我质疑理论具有明确定义的唯名论内容的观点，以及因果活动是承诺实体现实的必要条件的观点。在第四节中，我对理论的唯名论的充分性的概念提出了挑战。
In this paper, I discuss the prospects of nominalistic scientific realism (NSR) and show that it fails on many counts. In section 2, I discuss what is required for NSR to get off the ground. In section 3, I question the idea that theories have well-defined nominalistic content and the idea that causal activity is a necessary condition for commitment to the reality of an entity. In section 4, I challenge the notion of nominalistic adequacy of theories.