Information Feedback in a Dynamic Tournament
Information Feedback in a Dynamic Tournament
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.409000
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发表时间：
2003-05
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Masaki Aoyagi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Masaki Aoyagi
本文研究了多阶段锦标赛中的信息披露问题，其中代理人在每个阶段的努力产生了一个随机的性能信号，由委托人私下观察。委托人通过反馈策略控制代理人的努力激励，将其私人信息转化为公开信息。最优反馈策略是最大化代理的期望努力的策略。本文分析了校长在什么情况下应该采用不透露任何信息的无反馈策略，还是透露所有信息的全反馈策略。
This paper studies the problem of information revelation in a multi-stage tournament where the agents' effort in each stage gives rise to a stochastic performance signal privately observed by the principal. The principal controls the agents' effort incentive through the use of a feedback policy, which transforms his private information into a public announcement. The optimal feedback policy is one that maximizes the agents' expected effort. The paper identifies when the principal should use the no-feedback policy that reveals no information, or the full-feedback policy that reveals all his information.