The logic of epistemic justification.
The logic of epistemic justification.
复制标题
认知论证的逻辑。
DOI：
10.1007/s11229-017-1422-z
复制
发表时间：
2018
期刊：
影响因子：
1.5
通讯作者：
Smith M
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Smith M
Theories of epistemic justification are commonly assessed by exploring their predictions about particular hypothetical cases—predictions as to whether justification is present or absent in this or that case. With a few exceptions, it is much less common for theories of epistemic justification to be assessed by exploring their predictions aboutlogical principles. The exceptions are a handful of ‘closure’ principles, which have received a lot of attention, and which certain theories of justification are well known to invalidate. But these closure principles are only a small sample of the logical principles that we might consider. In this paper, I will outline four further logical principles that plausibly hold for justification and two which plausibly do not. While my primary aim is just to put these principles forward, I will use them to evaluate some different approaches to justification and (tentatively) conclude that a ‘normic’ theory of justification best captures its logic.
