The Monitoring Role of Female Directors Over Accounting Quality
The Monitoring Role of Female Directors Over Accounting Quality
复制标题
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2732588
复制
发表时间：
2016-02
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Juan M. García Lara;Beatriz García Osma;Araceli Mora;Mariano Scapin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Juan M. García Lara;Beatriz García Osma;Araceli Mora;Mariano Scapin
最近的会计研究表明，女性董事比男性董事对财务报告过程进行更严格的监督。然而，金融和经济学方面的一项新兴文献提供了各种不同的调查结果，并提出了女性领导角色是否与男性领导角色存在显著差异的问题。基于这些文献，我们重新审视了女性董事的存在，性别偏见和财务报表质量之间的联系。使用一个大样本的英国公司，我们发现，独立董事中的女性比例较大，与较低的盈余管理做法显着相关。然而，我们表明，这种关系消失，如果我们把重点放在公司不歧视妇女在获得董事职位。最后，我们提供的证据表明，性别偏见与较低的收入质量。我们认为，我们的研究结果与（1）先前的证据一致，即男性和女性在高度专业化的职位上扮演同样的角色时没有实质性差异，以及（2）歧视是解释女性董事与会计质量之间联系的重要因素。
Recent research in accounting suggests female directors exert more stringent monitoring over the financial reporting process than their male counterparts. However, an emerging literature in finance and economics provides mixed findings and questions whether females in leadership roles significantly differ from their male counterparts. Building on this literature, we re-examine the link between the presence of female directors, gender biases, and financial statements quality. Using a large sample of UK firms we find that a larger percentage of women among independent directors is significantly associated with lower earnings management practices. However, we show that this relation disappears if we focus on firms that do not discriminate against women in the access to directorships. Finally, we provide evidence that gender biases are associated with lower earnings quality. We interpret our results as consistent with (1) prior evidence that males and females do not differ substantially when performing the same role in highly specialized positions, and with (2) discrimination being an important factor explaining the association between female directors and accounting quality.