Intentional action in ordinary language: core concept or pragmatic understanding?
Intentional action in ordinary language: core concept or pragmatic understanding?
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-8284.2004.00480.x
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发表时间：
2004-04-01
期刊：
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
Steadman, A
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Adams, F;Steadman, A
在哲学家中，关于意图行为的核心概念至少有两种流行的观点。观点一（Adams 1986, 1997; McCann 1986）认为，只有当S有意做A时，代理人S才有意做A行为。观点二（Bratman 1987; Harman 1976; and Mele 1992）认为，在某些情况下，只要预见到要做A，并且S愿意接受作为S行为后果的A， S就会有意做A，而不是有意做A。Joshua Knobe （2003a）提供了一些有趣的数据来支持第二种观点。Knobe的数据显示了民间判断的不对称性。如果A被认为造成了伤害（例如破坏环境），人们更倾向于判断S是故意的，即使不是故意的。这是一种不对称，因为如果A被认为会带来好处（例如改善环境），人们就不会倾向于认为S的行为是有意的，而不是有意的。在本文中，我们将详细讨论Knobe的结果。我们将提出一个问题，即他对民间判断的普通语言调查是否触及了意图行为的核心概念。我们怀疑，相反，Knobe的调查正在挖掘有意语言的实用主义方面及其在道德表扬和谴责中的作用。我们将建议我们计划进行的替代调查来获得这种差异，我们将试图解释意向语言的语用用法。我们怀疑，民间关于故意行为的观念并没有得到明确的阐述。有意地执行一个动作需要许多因素。其中之一涉及意图和预期行为之间的因果关系。没有多少人对上述两种观点都有明确的反事实因果关系的概念行动对意图的依赖是意图行为所必需的。如果一个意图通过因果偏差与其满足条件相联系，那么这个行为就不是故意的——1在另一篇文章中，Knobe （2003b）提出了更有力的主张，他的实验结果确实表明，道德考虑进入了一个行为是否为故意的核心概念。如果这是真的，他的结果将倾向于支持第二种观点。在讨论的论文中，Knobe （2003a）只声称民间概念中存在不对称，因此“要求一般答案是错误的”（191）。
Among philosophers, there are at least two prevalent views about the core concept of intentional action. View I (Adams 1986, 1997; McCann 1986) holds that an agent S intentionally does an action A only if S intends to do A. View II (Bratman 1987; Harman 1976; and Mele 1992) holds that there are cases where S intentionally does A without intending to do A, as long as doing A is foreseen and S is willing to accept A as a consequence of S's action. Joshua Knobe (2003a) presents intriguing data that may be taken to support the second view.'Knobe's data show an asymmetry in folk judgements. People are more inclined to judge that S did A intentionally, even when not intended, if A was perceived as causing a harm (eg harming the environment). There is an asymmetry because people are not inclined to see S's action as intentional, when not intended, if A is perceived as causing a benefit (eg helping the environment). In this paper we will discuss Knobe's results in detail. We will raise the question of whether his ordinary language surveys of folk judgments have accessed core concepts of intentional action. We suspect that instead Knobe's surveys are tapping into pragmatic aspects of intentional language and its role in moral praise and blame. We will suggest alternative surveys that we plan to conduct to get at this difference, and we will attempt to explain the pragmatic usage of intentional language. We suspect that folk notions of intentional action are not clearly articulated. There are many factors required for an action to be performed intentionally. One of them involves the causal relation between an intention and the intended action. Not many folk would have very clear notions of counterfactual causal dependency of action upon intention necessary for inten-tional action on either view above. If an intention is connected by causal deviance to its conditions of satisfaction, the action is not done intention-1 In another article Knobe (2003b) makes the stronger claim that his experimental results do indeed show that moral considerations enter into the core concept of whether or not an action is intentional. If true, his results would tend to support View II. In the paper under discussion Knobe (2003a) only claims that there is an asym-metry in the folk concept and therefore it would be a'mistake to ask for a general answer'(191).