Real Arguments Are Approximate Arguments
Real Arguments Are Approximate Arguments
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发表时间：
2007-07
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通讯作者：
A. Hunter
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作者：
A. Hunter
有许多用于逻辑论证建模的框架。它们结合了单个论点的正式表示和比较冲突论点的技术。基于逻辑的论证的一个常见假设是，一个论证是一对 (Φ, α)，其中 Φ 是知识库的最小子集，使得 Φ 是一致的，并且 Φ 包含主张 α。然而，真正的论证（即人类提出的论证）通常没有足够明确提出的前提来支持主张。这是因为论证的支持者和接受者可以假设一些常识。这允许论证的支持者通过忽略常识将论证编码为真实论证，并且允许真实论证的接收者通过利用常识将其解码为论证。如果提出者和接受者都使用相同的常识，那么这个过程就很简单。不幸的是，情况并非总是如此，并且需要一种近似论证的概念，以便接收者应对关于构成常识的不同观点之间的差异。
There are a number of frameworks for modelling argumentation in logic. They incorporate a formal representation of individual arguments and techniques for comparing conflicting arguments. A common assumption for logic-based argumentation is that an argument is a pair (Φ, α) where Φ is minimal subset of the knowledgebase such that Φ is consistent and Φ entails the claim α. However, real arguments (i.e. arguments presented by humans) usually do not have enough explicitly presented premises for the entailment of the claim. This is because there is some common knowledge that can be assumed by a proponent of an argument and the recipient of it. This allows the proponent of an argument to encode an argument into a real argument by ignoring the common knowledge, and it allows a recipient of a real argument to decode it into an argument by drawing on the common knowledge. If both the proponent and recipient use the same common knowledge, then this process is straightforward. Unfortunately, this is not always the case, and raises the need for an approximation of the notion of an argument for the recipient to cope with the disparities between the different views on what constitutes common knowledge.