Immigration and Outsourcing: A General-Equilibrium Analysis
Immigration and Outsourcing: A General-Equilibrium Analysis
复制标题
移民与外包：一般均衡分析
DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-9361.2010.00563.x
复制
发表时间：
2005
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Howard J Wall
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Subhayu Bandyopadhyay;Howard J Wall
本文在国际要素流动的一般均衡模型中分析了移民与外包。在我们的模型中，熟练劳动力的合法移民是通过配额来控制的，而外包是由企业根据市场条件和政策强加的壁垒来决定的。放宽移民配额减少了外包，使资本家富裕起来，导致本地工人损失，并提高了国民收入。如果一个国家的目标是由外部因素决定的移民水平，那么第二好的外包税既可以是正面的，也可以是负面的。如果由于收入分配的考虑，除了移民目标外，还有工资目标，则需要外判补贴。我们将分析扩展到考虑非熟练劳动力的非法移民。如果熟练劳动力和非熟练劳动力在生产中互为补充（替代），那么较高的合法移民配额将导致更多（更少）非法移民。
This paper analyzes immigration and outsourcing in a general-equilibrium model of international factor mobility. In our model, legal immigration of skilled labor is controlled through a quota, while outsourcing is determined both by the firms in response to market conditions and through policy-imposed barriers. A loosening of the immigration quota reduces outsourcing, enriches capitalists, leads to losses for native workers, and raises national income. If the nation targets an exogenously determined immigration level, the second-best outsourcing tax can be either positive or negative. If in addition to the immigration target there is a wage target arising out of income distribution concerns, an outsourcing subsidy is required. We extend the analysis to consider illegal immigration of unskilled labor. A higher legal immigration quota will lead to more (less) illegal immigration if skilled and unskilled labor are complements (substitutes) in production.
日韩企业数字家电的全球竞争（一）
DOI：
--
发表时间：
2006
期刊：
現代コリア 第462号
影响因子：
--
作者：
古川一郎;上原渉;Kaoru Sugihara;坂野友昭(with Kevin E. Voss et al.);田中道雄;林廣茂;Takashi Oishi;田中 道雄;高井透;田中道雄;林廣茂
通讯作者：
林廣茂