The Timing of Labor Market Expansions: New Facts and a New Hypothesis
The Timing of Labor Market Expansions: New Facts and a New Hypothesis
复制标题
劳动力市场扩张的时机：新事实和新假设
DOI：
10.1086/593079
复制
发表时间：
2008
影响因子：
7.7
通讯作者：
Moscarini G
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Moscarini G
就业和工资的周期性行为对宏观经济学家来说仍然是一个巨大的挑战。商业周期的其他方面没有得到如此广泛的研究，也没有像现在这样鲜为人知。尽管人们慢慢形成共识，认为搜寻摩擦对于解释均衡失业的重要性，以及无法用可观察到的工人和企业特征解释的剩余工资不平等，我们仍不知道工资是如何在实践中设定的。当劳动力需求在更高的生产率或实际商品需求的推动下上升时，工人究竟是如何获得更高的工资的？为什么在经济周期扩张的过程中，工资会逐渐缓慢增长？寻找和匹配商业周期的文献通常假设工资是通过讨价还价的过程来解决的，但没有确定当事人讨价还价能力的来源。关于工资不平等的搜索文献总是处于稳定状态，并从总体波动中抽象出来，通常假设公司拥有完全的垄断权力，并提出要么接受要么放弃的雇佣合同。为了使这一直观而似是而非的假设与工人租金和工资不平等的现实相一致，并避免戴蒙德(1971)悖论，伯德特和莫滕森(1998)以道德风险的形式确定了工人讨价还价能力的来源。具体地说，工人拿到的工资超过了他们的保留工资，以便被诱使离开他们以前的雇主，一旦被雇用，就拒绝未来的外部工作。偷猎是个体工人工资增长和差异化的引擎。
The cyclical behavior of (un) employment and wages still poses a formidable challenge to macroeconomists. No other aspect of the business cycle has been as widely studied and remains as poorly understood. While a consensus has slowly emerged on the importance of search frictions to explain equilibrium unemployment, as well as residual wage inequality unexplained by observable worker and firm characteristics, we still do not know how wages are set in practice. When labor demand rises, driven by higher productivity or real demand for goods, how is it exactly that workers obtain higher wages? And why do wages rise gradually and slowly over business cycle expansions? The search‐and‐matching business cycle literature commonly assumes that wages are settled through a bargaining process but does not identify the source of parties’ bargaining power. The search literature on wage inequality, invariably cast in steady state and abstracting from aggregate fluctuations, typically assumes that firms have full monopsony power and make take‐it‐or‐leave‐it offers of employment contracts. To reconcile this intuitive and plausible assumption with the reality of worker rents and wage inequality and to avoid the Diamond (1971) paradox, Burdett and Mortensen (1998) identify the source of workers’ bargaining power in a form of moral hazard. Specifically, workers obtain more than their reservation wage in order to be induced to quit their previous employer and, once hired, to decline future outside offers. Poaching is the engine of wage growth and differentiation for individual workers.
登录
查看更多内容
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.473202
发表时间：
2003
期刊：
Labor: Supply & Demand
影响因子：
--
作者：
Gadi Barlevy
通讯作者：
Gadi Barlevy
影响因子：
3.8
作者：
Gadi Barlevy
通讯作者：
Gadi Barlevy
连续生产率离散的均衡搜索：理论和非参数估计
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.176075
发表时间：
1998
期刊：
Labor: Labor Markets eJournal
影响因子：
--
作者：
C. Bontemps;J. Robin;Gerard J. van den Berg
通讯作者：
Gerard J. van den Berg
拉丁美洲的微观经济灵活性
DOI：
10.3386/w10398
发表时间：
2004
期刊：
MIT Economics Department Working Paper Series
影响因子：
--
作者：
Ricardo J. Caballero;Eduardo M. R. A. Engel;A. Micco
通讯作者：
A. Micco
影响因子：
6.4
作者：
Broersma, L;Gautier, P
通讯作者：
Gautier, P