Who's who in networks.: Wanted:: The key player
Who's who in networks.: Wanted:: The key player
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00709.x
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发表时间：
2006-09-01
期刊：
影响因子：
6.1
通讯作者：
Zenou, Yves
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ballester, Coralio;Calvo-Armengol, Antoni;Zenou, Yves
具有线性二次效用的有限种群非合作博弈，其中每个参与者决定她施加多少行动，可以被解释为具有局部支付互补性的网络博弈，以及全局一致的支付替代性组件和自适应效应。对于这些博弈，每个参与者的纳什均衡行动与她在局部互补网络中的Bonacich中心性成正比，从而与社交网络的社会学文献建立了桥梁。这种Bonacich-Nash联系意味着总均衡随着网络规模和密度的增加而增加。然后，我们分析了一个政策，包括针对关键球员，也就是说，球员谁，一旦删除，导致最佳的变化，在总活动。我们提供了一个几何表征的关键球员确定的intercentrality措施，它既考虑到球员的中心性和她的贡献的中心性的其他。
Finite population noncooperative games with linear-quadratic utilities, where each player decides how much action she exerts, can be interpreted as a network game with local payoff complementarities, together with a globally uniform payoff substitutability component and an own-concavity effect. For these games, the Nash equilibrium action of each player is proportional to her Bonacich centrality in the network of local complementarities, thus establishing a bridge with the sociology literature on social networks. This Bonacich-Nash linkage implies that aggregate equilibrium increases with network size and density. We then analyze a policy that consists of targeting the key player, that is, the player who, once removed, leads to the optimal change in aggregate activity. We provide a geometric characterization of the key player identified with an intercentrality measure, which takes into account both a player's centrality and her contribution to the centrality of the others.