Collective decision making with a mix of majority and minority seekers.
Collective decision making with a mix of majority and minority seekers.
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DOI：
10.1103/physreve.93.052308
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发表时间：
2016-03
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Petter Holme;Hang-Hyun Jo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Petter Holme;Hang-Hyun Jo
研究了一种基于种群内部信息传播的二元决策模型，该模型是完全连通或覆盖方形网格的。我们假设一小部分人想做少数人的选择，而其余的人想做多数人的选择。这类似于“逆向”行为者的观点传播，但从博弈论的角度来看，行为者试图以与共同利益不相容的方式优化自己的处境。当这个分数小于1/2时，总体可以有效地自组织到一个状态，在这个状态中，代理人得到他们想要的——大多数人（即多数寻求者）有一种意见，少数寻求者有另一种意见。如果分数大于1/2，那么总体上就会有挫败感，这会极大地改变动态。在这个地区，经过一些不同的阶段，人口趋于一种意见大致相等的状态。刚好超过阈值，群体的状态离集体最优解最远。
We study a model of a population making a binary decision based on information spreading within the population, which is fully connected or covering a square grid. We assume that a fraction of the population wants to make the choice of the minority, whereas the rest want to make the majority choice. This resembles opinion spreading with "contrarian" agents but has the game theoretic aspect that agents try to optimize their own situation in ways that are incompatible with the common good. When this fraction is less than 1/2, the population can efficiently self-organize to a state where agents get what they want-the majority (i.e., the majority seekers) have one opinion, the minority seekers have the other. If the fraction is larger than 1/2, there is a frustration in the population that dramatically changes the dynamics. In this region, the population converges, through some distinct phases, to a state of approximately equal-sized opinions. Just over the threshold the state of the population is furthest from the collectively optimal solution.