Institutionalized Intervention: The 'Bunker Politics' of International Aid in Afghanistan
Institutionalized Intervention: The 'Bunker Politics' of International Aid in Afghanistan
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制度化干预：阿富汗国际援助的“地堡政治”
DOI：
10.1080/17502977.2019.1565814
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发表时间：
2019
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
Weigand F
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Weigand F
阿富汗已被视为困扰和平与安全行动的安全威胁的象征，在本文中，我们考虑通过国际工作人员的“掩体”来应对此类威胁。通过对喀布尔的援助和建设和平官员进行的深入定性调查，我们说明了看似平凡的风险管理程序如何对干预机构产生负面影响；干预者与国家行为者之间的关系；并出于干预本身的目的。我们认为，加油是一种深刻的政治性——将工作人员“囚禁”在壁垒后面，同时对考虑不周的国际干预模式产生一种存在和控制的错觉。
Afghanistan has come to be seen as emblematic of the security threats besetting peace and security operations, and in this article we consider the response to such threats via the ‘bunkering’ of international staff. Drawing on an in-depth qualitative survey with aid and peacebuilding officials in Kabul, we illustrate how seemingly mundane risk management procedures have negative consequences for intervening institutions; for the relation between interveners and national actors; and for the purpose of intervention itself. Bunkering, we argue, is deeply political – ‘imprisoning’ staff behind ramparts while generating an illusion of presence and control for ill-conceived modes of international intervention.