EMERGING FIRMS AND THE ALLOCATION OF CONTROL RIGHTS: A BAYESIAN APPROACH
EMERGING FIRMS AND THE ALLOCATION OF CONTROL RIGHTS: A BAYESIAN APPROACH
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DOI：
10.5465/amr.2009.36982616
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发表时间：
2009-04-01
影响因子：
16.4
通讯作者：
Parker, Simon C.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Alvarez, Sharon A.;Parker, Simon C.
这篇论文表明，创始人经常利用公司组建来利用机会，并且有时必须在机会的经济价值能够可靠地甚至是概率地知道之前就做出关于控制权分配的组织决策。在此背景下，我们运用不完全契约理论，将贝叶斯学习模型应用于新兴企业创始人所有权控制权的分配过程。这个模型考察了创始人如何学习和建立他们先前的信念，使他们能够在不同的风险和不确定性条件下分配和改变所有权控制权。
This paper suggests that founders often use firm formation to exploit opportunities and must sometimes make organizing decisions about the allocation of control before the economic value of the opportunity can reliably be known even probabilistically. Motivated by questions surroundings such settings, we use incomplete contract theory and apply a Bayesian learning model to the allocation process of ownership control rights of founders in emerging firms. This model examines how founders learn and build on their prior beliefs, enabling them to allocate and change ownership control rights under differing conditions of risk and uncertainty.