Public Support for Market Reforms in New Democracies
Public Support for Market Reforms in New Democracies
复制标题
新民主国家市场改革的公众支持
DOI：
10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500036
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发表时间：
2003
期刊：
影响因子：
1.2
通讯作者：
P. Vanhuysse
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
P. Vanhuysse
标准的回顾性经济投票模型倾向于假设，如果现任政府不能使公民在物质上更好，公民就会投票反对现任政府。这七个贡献的集合开始于观察，这种假设是没有根据的背景下，新兴的民主国家正在经历社会代价高昂的市场改革。即使投票动机主要是经济驱动的，这是远远不不言自明的期望，选民在这种情况下将系统地反对他们的自由选举的政府一旦经济状况恶化，因为“正常”的回顾性投票逻辑会预测。毕竟，新的民主国家很少构成“一切照旧”的政治环境。在许多情况下，过去的政权不仅不民主，而且在政治上不受欢迎，在经济上表现不佳。此外，在向市场民主过渡期间，“J曲线”论点（“为了让事情变得更好，他们首先需要变得更糟”）和“遗产”论点（“我们现在因为过去的无能而受苦”）可能至少在一段时间内对选民来说是合理的。苏珊·斯托克斯（Susan Stokes）在社论引言中指出，新民主国家的公民在经济状况恶化时至少可以采取三种可想象的替代方式做出反应。首先，他们可能会采用跨期投票逻辑，期待繁荣的快速到来，因此支持政府。第二，他们可能会采取一种开脱的逻辑，预计未来会继续困难，但指责政府目前的反对者和/或过去的力量。第三，选民可能期望整体经济有所改善，但尽管如此，他们还是投票反对现任政府，因为他们认为自己的成本太高（分配逻辑）或者因为他们认为反对党会做得更好（反对派的逻辑）。为了检验这些建议，这本书介绍了基于官方总体经济数据和六个新民主国家的民意数据的案例研究，这些国家经历了深刻的亲民主主义，市场改革。这些案例涵盖1980-1995年的西班牙（作者：Jose Marıa Maravall和Adam Przeworski），柏林围墙倒塌后的东德国（作者：Christopher安德森和Yuliya Tverdova），Balcerowicz“休克疗法”计划期间的波兰（作者：Adam Przeworski），1988 -1997年的墨西哥（作者：Jorge Ravidia拉雷多），1988-1996年的阿根廷（作者：Fabian Echevary和卡洛斯Elordi），以及
Standard retrospective economic voting models tend to assume that citizens vote against incumbent governments if these fail to make them materially better off. This collection of seven contributions starts from the observation that such an assumption is unwarranted in the context of newly emerging democracies experiencing socially costly market reforms. Even if voting motives are primarily economically driven, it is far from self-evident to expect that voters in such contexts will systematically turn against their freely elected governments once economic conditions deteriorate, as the ‘normal’retrospective voting logic would predict. After all, new democracies rarely constitute ‘politics-as-usual’contexts. In many cases, the past regime, in addition to being undemocratic, was both politically unpopular and economically underperforming. Moreover, during the transition to market democracy ‘J curve’arguments (‘for things to get better, they first need to get worse’) and ‘legacy’arguments (‘we suffer now because of past incompetence’) may appear reasonable to voters for some time at least. In her editorial introduction, Susan Stokes indicates at least three conceivable alternative ways for citizens in new democracies to react in times of worsening economic conditions. First, they may adopt an intertemporal voting logic, expecting the quick arrival of prosperity and therefore supporting the government. Second, they may adopt an exonerating logic, expecting hardship to continue in the future but blaming the government’s current opponents and/or the forces of the past. Third, voters may expect the economy as a whole to improve, but nevertheless vote against the incumbent government because they judge the costs for themselves to be too high (the distributional logic) or because they think opposition parties will do better (the oppositionist logic).To test these proposals, the book presents case studies based on official aggregate economic data and on roughly similar sets of public opinion data in six new democracies undergoing deep pro-market reforms. The cases encompass Spain in 1980–1995 (by Jose Marıa Maravall and Adam Przeworski), East Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall (by Christopher Anderson and Yuliya Tverdova), Poland during the Balcerowicz ‘shock therapy’plan (by Adam Przeworski), Mexico in 1988–1997 (by Jorge Buendia Laredo), Argentina in 1988–1996 (by Fabian Echevary and Carlos Elordi), and