Economic Interests and the Origins of Electoral Systems
Economic Interests and the Origins of Electoral Systems
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经济利益与选举制度的起源
DOI：
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发表时间：
2007
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
D. Soskice
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Thomas R. Cusack;Torben Iversen;D. Soskice
对选举制度选择的标准解释是，基于Rokkan的开创性工作，比例代表制(PR)被分裂的右翼采用，以捍卫其阶级利益，抵御崛起的左翼。但新的证据表明，公关加强了左翼和再分配，我们认为，标准观点在历史上、分析上和经验上都是错误的。我们给出了一个截然不同的解释。整合了对公关的两种对立解释--最小赢利联盟和共识--我们认为，当右翼人士支持共识监管框架，特别是对劳动力市场和技能形成的支持时，他们对共同特定投资重要的监管框架的支持，超过了他们对再分配后果的反对；这发生在以前组织密集的当地经济的国家。在劳资关系敌对、企业和工会协调不力的国家，保留多数派机构有助于遏制左翼。这解释了当前各种资本主义和选举制度之间的密切联系，以及为什么它们会随着时间的推移而存在。
The standard explanation for the choice of electoral institutions, building on Rokkan's seminal work, is that proportional representation (PR) was adopted by a divided right to defend its class interests against a rising left. But new evidence shows that PR strengthens the left and redistribution, and we argue the standard view is wrong historically, analytically, and empirically. We offer a radically different explanation. Integrating two opposed interpretations of PR—minimum winning coalitions versus consensus—we propose that the right adopted PR when their support for consensual regulatory frameworks, especially those of labor markets and skill formation where co-specific investments were important, outweighed their opposition to the redistributive consequences; this occurred in countries with previously densely organized local economies. In countries with adversarial industrial relations, and weak coordination of business and unions, keeping majoritarian institutions helped contain the left. This explains the close association between current varieties of capitalism and electoral institutions, and why they persist over time.