Spreading order: religion, cooperative niche construction, and risky coordination problems
Spreading order: religion, cooperative niche construction, and risky coordination problems
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DOI：
10.1007/s10539-011-9295-x
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发表时间：
2012-01-01
影响因子：
2.5
通讯作者：
Bulbulia, Joseph
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Bulbulia, Joseph
适应论者从宗教承诺的合作效应来解释宗教的进化，但是宗教进化是为了解决哪些合作问题呢？本文主要研究一类对称协调问题，该问题存在两个纯纳什均衡：(1)ALL cooperative，这是一种高效但依赖于充分合作的均衡；(2) ALL DEFECT，这是低效的，但不管别人选择什么都能得到回报。正式研究和实验研究表明，对于这类风险协调问题，只有缺陷均衡是进化稳定的。以下内容解释了宗教认知和文化的其他令人费解的特性，这些特性是合作设计的特征，它们的进化是为了稳定这种危险的交换。这个模型很有趣，因为它解释了宗教数据中挥之不去的谜题，并且更好地将宗教的进化理论与最近的、动机良好的合作生态位构建模型结合起来。
Adaptationists explain the evolution of religion from the cooperative effects of religious commitments, but which cooperation problem does religion evolve to solve? I focus on a class of symmetrical coordination problems for which there are two pure Nash equilibriums: (1) ALL COOPERATE, which is efficient but relies on full cooperation; (2) ALL DEFECT, which is inefficient but pays regardless of what others choose. Formal and experimental studies reveal that for such risky coordination problems, only the defection equilibrium is evolutionarily stable. The following makes sense of otherwise puzzling properties of religious cognition and cultures as features of cooperative designs that evolve to stabilise such risky exchange. The model is interesting because it explains lingering puzzles in the data on religion, and better integrates evolutionary theories of religion with recent, well-motivated models of cooperative niche construction.