Standing Voting Instructions: Empowering the Excluded Retail Investor
Standing Voting Instructions: Empowering the Excluded Retail Investor
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常设投票说明：赋予被排除在外的散户投资者权力
DOI：
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Jill E. Fisch
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作者：
Jill E. Fisch
尽管股东投票越来越重要，但监管机构很少关注散户投资者的权利，他们拥有约30%的上市公司，但投票权不到30%。导致投票率偏低的一个重要因素是散户投资者投票的过时机制。联邦代理投票规则将促进零售投票的主要责任交给了托管经纪人，他们没有足够的动力来开发可行的程序，而目前的监管限制阻碍了以市场为基础的创新，包括技术创新。
其中最有前途的创新是常设投票指示（SVI）。SVI允许投资者在股东大会之前指定其投票偏好，并根据这些偏好投票。尽管机构投资者很容易获得SVI，但联邦代理规则阻止散户投资者使用SVI，寻求修改这些规则的提案已在美国证券交易委员会（SEC）搁置多年。SEC未能采取行动的主要理由是担心SVI将导致不知情的投票。
这篇文章解决并拒绝声称不知情投票的风险证明了SEC未能消除对SVI的监管障碍。目前的技术与创建投票平台是一致的，这些平台允许散户投资者有意义地参与投票过程，同时保留适当的保障措施，以尽量减少潜在的不利影响。具有讽刺意味的是，实施允许SVI的投票平台有可能使散户投资者的投票更有效、更知情，并提高公司民主的合法性。
Despite the increasing importance of shareholder voting, regulators have paid little attention to the rights of retail investors who own approximately 30% of publicly traded companies but who vote less than 30% of their shares. A substantial factor contributing to this low turnout is the antiquated mechanism by which retail investors vote. The federal proxy voting rules place primary responsibility for facilitating retail voting in the hands of custodial brokers who have limited incentives to develop workable procedures, and current regulatory restrictions impede market-based innovation that incorporate technological innovations.
One of the most promising such innovations is standing voting instructions (SVI). SVI allows investors to designate their voting preferences in advance of shareholders’ meetings and have their shares voted in accordance with those preferences. Although SVI is readily available to institutional investors, the federal proxy rules prevent its use by retail investors, and proposals seeking modifications of these rules have languished before the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) for years. The SEC’s primary rationale for failing to act is the concern that SVI will lead to uninformed voting.
This Article addresses and rejects the claim that the risk of uninformed voting justifies the SEC’s failure to remove the regulatory obstacles to SVI. Current technology is consistent with the creation of voting platforms that allow retail investors meaningful participation in the voting process while retaining appropriate safeguards to minimize the potential for adverse effects. Ironically, implementation of voting platforms allowing SVI has the potential to make retail investor voting both more efficient and better informed and to increase the legitimacy of corporate democracy.