I—The Presidential Address: Counterfactuals
I—The Presidential Address: Counterfactuals
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I——总统讲话：反事实
DOI：
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发表时间：
2008
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通讯作者：
D. Edgington
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作者：
D. Edgington
我认为，条件句的假设观点，这是相当流行的指示性条件句，也延伸到虚拟或反事实条件句。根据这一观点，条件判断不应被解释为事实的、绝对的判断，而应被解释为在前件的假设下对后件的判断。支持这一观点的最有力证据来自于关注这样一个事实：条件判断往往是不确定的;而条件不确定性是一个很好理解的概念，它的功能与事实问题的不确定性不同。我认为，这一观点的证据是强大的虚拟，因为它是指示。
I argue that the suppositional view of conditionals, which is quite popular for indicative conditionals, extends also to subjunctive or counterfactual conditionals. According to this view, conditional judgements should not be construed as factual, categorical judgements, but as judgements about the consequent under the supposition of the antecedent. The strongest evidence for the view comes from focusing on the fact that conditional judgements are often uncertain; and conditional uncertainty, which is a well-understood notion, does not function like uncertainty about matters of fact. I argue that the evidence for this view is as strong for subjunctives as it is for indicatives.