Shared investment in general training: the role of information
Shared investment in general training: the role of information
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一般培训的共享投资：信息的作用
DOI：
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发表时间：
1990
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
E. Katz
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
E. Katz
本文的主要前提是，潜在的招聘人员并不掌握有关工人在职培训的程度和类型的太多信息。接受过培训的工人可能没有接受过或很少接受过一般培训。此外，为特定工作招聘的工人可能接受了错误类型的一般培训。所有这些都给招聘而不是培训的公司带来了巨大的信息成本。这些成本包括机会成本、实际费用和增加的风险敞口。结果，招聘公司将提供比培训他的公司更低的工资，并且对受过一般培训的招聘工人给予较低的重视。
The major premise of this paper is that potential recruiters do not possess much information on the extent and type of workers' on-the-job-training. Workers taken for trained might turn out to possess no, or very little, general training. Also, a worker recruited for a given job may possess the wrong type of general training. All this imposes substantial information-based costs on firms that recruit rather than train. These costs include opportunity costs, actual expenses and increased exposure to risk. As a result, a recruiting firm will offer lower wages and place a lower value on a recruited worker with general training than the firm that trained him.