Upward Nominal Wage Rigidity
Upward Nominal Wage Rigidity
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名义工资刚性上调
DOI：
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
P. Portugal
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Paulo Guimarães;F. Martins;P. Portugal
在葡萄牙，与欧洲大陆的许多其他国家一样，工会和雇主协会之间的集体工资协议系统地扩展到整个行业，这些协议规定了特定职位的最低工资标准。这意味着许多公司有义务增加员工的工资，以遵守新商定的工资协议。带着些许不安，我们将这种现象称为向上的名义工资刚性，这与凯恩斯关于向下的名义工资刚性的概念非常一致。在这篇文章中，我们提供的证据表明，受谈判工资下限变化影响更大的公司会降低他们的雇用率，更重要的是，显著提高他们的离职率。作为对我们分析的补充，我们建议估计一种试图区分内部和外部工资条件强度的指标。基于这一衡量标准，我们表明，工资受外部工资影响较大的公司的净就业创建率要低得多。
In Portugal, as in many other countries in continental Europe, the collective wage agreements between trade unions and employer associations that define wage floors for specific job titles are systematically extended to the whole industry. This means that many firms are obliged to increase the wages of their workforce in order to comply with the newly-agreed bargained wages. With some trepidation, we call this phenomenon upward nominal wage rigidity, in close symmetry with the Keynesian notion of downward nominal wage rigidity. In this paper we provide evidence that firms that are more heavily affected by the change in the bargained wage floors decrease their hiring rates and, more importantly, significantly increase their separation rates. As a complement to our analysis, we suggest the estimation of a measure that attempts to disentangle the strength of internal and external wage conditions. Based on this measure we show that firms whose wages are more influenced by external wages exhibit much lower net job creation rates.
大衰退后的工会和集体谈判：来自葡萄牙的证据
影响因子：
2.6
作者：
Addison J
通讯作者：
Addison J