Collective action and geoengineering

Collective action and geoengineering
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集体行动和地球工程

DOI:
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发表时间:
2018
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影响因子:
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通讯作者:
T. Sandler
T. Sandler
中科院分区:
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文献类型:
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作者:
T. Sandler

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本文调查了地球工程中无数集体行动的影响。它的两个主要组成部分- -减少二氧化碳和改变反照率- -呈现出不同的集体行动和战略方面。根据捕获和封存过程的不同,二氧化碳减排可以表现为囚徒困境、阈值或和谐博弈。相反,反照率的改变可能遵循鸡、协调或阈值游戏。一旦部署,反照率调整就会出现成瘾问题,使目前的努力难以改变,即使是最初反对这种调整的国家。由于有许多程序,地球工程与许多集体行动问题联系在一起,这些问题可能在地球工程部署之前、期间或之后出现。对于二氧化碳的减少,治理涉及鼓励行动,而对于反照率的改变,治理涉及抑制单方面行动。后者可能是一个更困难的治理问题。
This paper investigates some of the myriad collective action implications of geoengineering. Its two major components – carbon dioxide reduction and albedo modification – present diverse collective action and strategic aspects. Carbon dioxide reduction may be characterized by Prisoners’ Dilemma, threshold, or harmony games, depending on capture and sequestration procedures. In contrast, albedo modification may abide by chicken, coordination, or threshold games. Once deployed, albedo modification presents an addiction problem that makes current efforts difficult to alter, even by countries originally opposed to such modification. With its many procedures, geoengineering is tied to a host of collective action problems that may ensue prior, during, or after geoengineering deployment. For carbon dioxide reduction, governance concerns encouraging action, while for albedo modification, governance concerns inhibiting unilateral action. The latter may be a more difficult governance issue.