Evolving public perceptions and stability in vaccine uptake
Evolving public perceptions and stability in vaccine uptake
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DOI：
10.1016/j.mbs.2006.08.015
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发表时间：
2006-12-01
影响因子：
4.3
通讯作者：
Galvani, Alison P.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Reluga, Timothy C.;Bauch, Chris T.;Galvani, Alison P.
最近的疫苗恐慌和疫苗需求的突然激增提醒我们，大规模疫苗接种计划的有效性取决于公众对疫苗接种的看法。先前的研究表明，个人优化自身利益的倾向可能导致疫苗接种水平对社区来说是次优的。我们使用博弈论将人口层面的疫苗需求与个人对感染和疫苗接种成本的不同信念的决策联系起来。与以前的工作提出，普遍接种疫苗是不可能的，在博弈论的背景下，我们表明，最佳的个人行为可以在普遍接种疫苗和不接种疫苗之间变化，这取决于个人的相对成本和收益。通过耦合博弈模型和流行病模型，我们证明了对自身利益的追求往往会导致稳定的动态，但随着时间的推移会导致疫苗吸收的振荡。在对疫苗和感染风险的看法较为同质的人群中，不稳定性加剧。这项研究说明了应用时间模型的重要性，一个固有的时间的情况下，即在知情的人口与自愿接种疫苗的政策，疫苗覆盖率的时间演变。(c)2006年爱思唯尔公司All rights reserved.
Recent vaccine scares and sudden spikes in vaccine demand remind us that the effectiveness of mass vaccination programs is governed by the public perception of vaccination. Previous work has shown that the tendency of individuals to optimize self-interest can lead to vaccination levels that are suboptimal for a community. We use game theory to relate population-level demand for vaccines to decision-making by individuals with varied beliefs about the costs of infection and vaccination. In contrast to previous work proposing that universal vaccination is impossible in a game theoretic context, we show that optimal individual behavior can vary between universal vaccination and no vaccination, depending on the relative costs and benefits to individuals. By coupling game models and epidemic models, we demonstrate that the pursuit of self-interest often leads to stable dynamics but can lead to oscillations in vaccine uptake over time. The instability is exacerbated in populations that are more homogeneous with respect to their perceptions of vaccine and infection risks. This research illustrates the importance of applying temporal models to an inherently temporal situation, namely, the time evolution of vaccine coverage in an informed population with a voluntary vaccination policy. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.