Innovation and Institutional Ownership
Innovation and Institutional Ownership
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DOI：
10.1257/aer.103.1.277
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发表时间：
2013-02-01
影响因子：
10.7
通讯作者：
Zingales, Luigi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Aghion, Philippe;Van Reenen, John;Zingales, Luigi
我们发现，更大的机构所有权与更多的创新相关。为了探索这一机制，我们将“懒惰管理者”假说与机构所有者通过降低职业风险来增加创新激励的模型进行了对比。证据有利于职业担忧。首先，我们发现机构所有权和产品市场竞争之间存在互补性，而懒惰管理者假说则预测替代。其次，当机构持股比例较高时，首席执行官在利润下滑时被解雇的可能性较小。最后，利用工具变量、政策变化以及按机构所有者类型进行分类，我们认为机构对创新的影响是因果关系。 (JEL G23、G32、L25、M10、O31、O34)
We find that greater institutional ownership is associated with more innovation. To explore the mechanism, we contrast the "lazy manager" hypothesis with a model where institutional owners increase innovation incentives through reducing career risks. The evidence favors career concerns. First, we find complementarity between institutional ownership and product market competition, whereas the lazy manager hypothesis predicts substitution. Second, CEOs are less likely to be fired in the face of profit downturns when institutional ownership is higher. Finally, using instrumental variables, policy changes, and disaggregating by type of institutional owner, we argue that the effect of institutions on innovation is causal. (JEL G23, G32, L25, M10, O31, O34)