Portfolio Salience and the Proportionality of Payoffs in Coalition Governments
Portfolio Salience and the Proportionality of Payoffs in Coalition Governments
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联合政府中的投资组合显着性和收益比例
DOI：
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发表时间：
2001
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
James N. Druckman
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Paul V. Warwick;James N. Druckman
在如何在议会联盟中的政党之间分配投资组合收益的问题上出现了根本分歧。一方面，有非常有力的经验证据表明，执政联盟中的政党往往会获得与其为联盟提供的立法支持数量成一比一比例的投资组合，也许稍微偏离比例，以牺牲领导联盟谈判的大党为代价。辩论的另一方是一系列正式的理论，它们提出了相反的观点--负责联合谈判的政党应该能够为自己获得不成比例的大部分投资组合收益。在这篇文章中，我们重新审视立法席位和投资组合收益之间的经验联系，借助一个新的和更广泛的数据集，不同的分析方法，以及我们所看到的因变量的更有效的操作，来解决这个脱节。这一操作化包括首次纳入有关各方所获投资组合的重要性或突出性的证据，而不仅仅是其数量。文章最后评估了我们的研究结果对议会民主制联盟成员奖励辩论的影响。
A fundamental divide has emerged over how portfolio payoffs are distributed among parties in parliamentary coalitions. On one side lies very strong empirical evidence that the parties in a governing coalition tend to receive portfolios in one-to-one proportion to the amount of legislative support they contribute to the coalition, with perhaps some slight deviations from proportionality coming at the expense of larger parties that lead coalition negotiations. On the other side of the debate lies a stream of formal theories that suggest the opposite – that parties in charge of coalition negotiations ought to be able to take a disproportionately large share of portfolio benefits for themselves. In this article, we address this disjuncture by re-examining the empirical connection between legislative seats and portfolio payoffs with the aid of a new and more extensive dataset, a different method of analysis, and what we see as a more valid operationalization of the dependent variable. This operationalization involves the inclusion, for the first time, of evidence concerning the importance or salience of the portfolios each party receives, as opposed to just their quantity. The article concludes with an assessment of the implications of our findings for the debate over the rewards of coalition membership in parliamentary democracies.