Emission Tax, Health Insurance, and Information: A Mechanism Design for Reducing Energy Consumption and Emission Risk
Emission Tax, Health Insurance, and Information: A Mechanism Design for Reducing Energy Consumption and Emission Risk
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DOI：
10.1007/s41885-021-00093-4
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发表时间：
2021-10
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Chiradip Chatterjee;Nafisa Halim;Pallab Mozumder
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作者：
Chiradip Chatterjee;Nafisa Halim;Pallab Mozumder
在美国和世界各地，能源需求的很大一部分是由来自传统化石燃料的能源满足的。燃烧化石燃料会导致严重的温室气体排放和颗粒物污染，这会转化为对健康的危害。消费可再生能源有助于减少碳足迹，降低健康风险。在这项研究中，我们提出了一个实验室实验的结果，在这个实验中，受试者参与了一个背景丰富的、具有不纯公共产品、风险和跨期折扣元素的激励游戏。受试者扮演着户主的角色，决定在节能技术上花费多少。这些支出降低了未来的能源成本和排放，以及与排放相关的健康风险和集团内每个人的相关医疗成本。折扣的特点是允许跨多轮储蓄和利息收入。每个受试者玩三个部分(基线、治疗和重复基线)，每个部分由30轮组成。这种处理有一个门槛公益特征，即排放税水平取决于该集团所做的整体节能投资。随着时间的推移，受试者在采用更多节能技术方面表现出显著的学习和财富效应。此外，受试者可以选择购买健康保险以降低风险。结果表明，当排污税被设定为奖励而不是惩罚，平均节能被购买医疗保险的选项挤出时，采用率更高。然而，平均而言，决定购买健康保险的受试者也比拒绝购买的受试者节省了更多的精力。
A major share of the energy demand in the United States and around the world is met by energy sources derived from conventional fossil fuels. Combustion of fossil fuels causes serious emission of greenhouse gases and particle pollution, that translates into health hazards. Consumption of renewable energy can help reduce the carbon footprint and cut down the health risk. In this study we present results from a lab experiment in which subjects participated in a context-rich, incentivized game with elements of an impure public good, risk, and intertemporal discounting. The subjects played the role of a household head to decide on how much to spend on energy saving technologies. The spending reduced the future energy cost and emission, as well as emission related health risk and associated medical costs for everyone in the group. The discounting was characterized by allowing to save with interest earnings across multiple rounds. Each subject played three sections (baseline, a treatment, and a repeated baseline) and each section was comprised of 30 rounds. The treatment had a threshold public good feature, where the emission tax level was dependent on the overall energy-saving investments made by the group. Subjects exhibited significant learning and wealth effect in adopting more energy saving technologies over time. Furthermore, subjected were given the option to purchase health insurance to mitigate risk. The result shows that the adoption rate is higher when the emission tax is framed as a reward rather than a punishment and average energy savings are crowded out with the option to purchase health insurance. However, on average subjects who decide to purchase health insurance also save more energy than those who refuse to purchase it.