Electoral Rules and Constitutional Structures as Constraints on Corruption
Electoral Rules and Constitutional Structures as Constraints on Corruption
复制标题
DOI：
10.1017/s0007123405000311
复制
发表时间：
2005-08
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
Jana Kunicová;S. Rose-Ackerman
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Jana Kunicová;S. Rose-Ackerman
选举规则和宪法结构可以影响政治腐败的程度。我们发现，比例代表制（PR）比多元化制度更容易腐败的政治寻租。我们认为，这一结果取决于PR和多元化制度的租金的不同地点，并在PR下的选民和反对党所面临的监测困难。我们还研究了选举规则和总统制之间的相互作用。我们测试我们的主要预测和相互作用的影响，最多94个民主国家的横截面。实证研究结果强烈支持我们的假设，公关系统，特别是连同总统制，与腐败的政治寻租水平较高。
Electoral rules and constitutional structures can influence the level of political corruption. We show that proportional representation (PR) systems are more susceptible to corrupt political rent-seeking than plurality systems. We argue that this result depends on the different loci of rents in PR and plurality systems, and on the monitoring difficulties faced by both voters and opposition parties under PR. We also examine the interaction between electoral rules and presidentialism. We test our main predictions and interaction effects on a cross-section of up to ninety-four democracies. The empirical findings strongly support our hypothesis that PR systems, especially together with presidentialism, are associated with higher levels of corrupt political rent-seeking.