Democratization by Elections? Competitive Clientelism in the Middle East
Democratization by Elections? Competitive Clientelism in the Middle East
复制标题
通过选举实现民主化？
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Ellen Lust
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ellen Lust
翻译后摘要：本文重新考虑威权选举和民主化之间的关系。在研究中东的立法选举时，它认为选举最好被理解为“竞争性客户主义”，即精英之间争夺有限的国家资源，然后将其分配给客户。这以系统的方式推动选民和候选人的行为，促进亲政权的议会，并允许现任精英主要通过制度规则而不是法外操纵来管理选举。文章最后考虑的机制，可能更有效地帮助促进民主化，独裁选举的逻辑。
Abstract:This article reconsiders the relationship between authoritarian elections and democratization. Examining legislative elections in the Middle East, it argues that elections are best understood as "competitive clientelism," a competition between elites over privileged access to a limited set of state resources that they can then distribute to their clients. This drives the behavior of voters and candidates in systematic ways that promote proregime parliaments and allow incumbent elites to manage elections largely through institutional rules rather than extralegal manipulation. The article concludes by considering mechanisms that may more effectively help to foster democratization, given the logic of authoritarian elections.