Horizontal Shareholding
Horizontal Shareholding
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横向持股
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2632024
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
E. Elhauge
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
E. Elhauge
横向持股是指一组共同的投资者在产品市场上的横向竞争者公司中拥有大量股份。经济模型表明，当国有企业在集中的市场中竞争时，大量的横向持股可能会提高价格。最近的实证研究不仅证实了这一预测，而且还揭示了这种横向持股在我们的经济中无处不在。我指出，这种横向持股有助于解释基本的经济学难题，包括为什么公司高管会因行业业绩而非单个公司业绩而获得奖励，为什么公司没有利用最近的高利润来扩大产出和就业，以及为什么经济不平等在近几十年来有所上升。我还表明，股票收购，创造反竞争的横向持股是非法的，根据现行的反垄断法，我建议反垄断执法行动，以撤销他们和他们的不利经济影响。
Horizontal shareholdings exist when a common set of investors own significant shares in corporations that are horizontal competitors in a product market. Economic models show that substantial horizontal shareholdings are likely to anticompetitively raise prices when the owned businesses compete in a concentrated market. Recent empirical work not only confirms this prediction, but also reveals that such horizontal shareholdings are omnipresent in our economy. I show that such horizontal shareholdings can help explain fundamental economic puzzles, including why corporate executives are rewarded for industry performance rather than individual corporate performance alone, why corporations have not used recent high profits to expand output and employment, and why economic inequality has risen in recent decades. I also show that stock acquisitions that create anticompetitive horizontal shareholdings are illegal under current antitrust law, and I recommend antitrust enforcement actions to undo them and their adverse economic effects.