Asset Bubbles and Bailouts
Asset Bubbles and Bailouts
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资产泡沫和救助
DOI：
10.1016/j.jmoneco.2015.09.008
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发表时间：
2015
影响因子：
4.1
通讯作者：
and Noriyuki Yanagawa
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Tomohiro Hirano;Masaru Inaba;and Noriyuki Yanagawa
只要气泡尺寸相对较小，气泡就会提高产量水平，但一旦尺寸变得太大，气泡就会降低产量。鉴于这种非单调关系，本文研究了泡沫与政府救助之间的关系。结果表明，对泡沫破裂的救助可能会对事前生产效率产生积极影响，并放宽随机泡沫的存在条件。救助水平与生产效率存在非单调关系，部分救助政策实现了生产效率。此外，它严格审查了纾困政策的福利效应，并表明，即使是没有风险的泡沫也可能对纳税人不利。
As long as bubble size is relatively small, bubbles increase production level, but once the size becomes too large, then bubbles reduce it. Given this non-monotonic relationship, this paper investigates the relationship between bubbles and government bailouts. It shows that bailouts for bursting bubbles may positively influence ex ante production efficiency and relax the existence condition of stochastic bubbles. The level of bailouts has a non-monotonic relationship with production efficiency and a “partial bailout” policy achieves production efficiency. Moreover, it examines the welfare effects of bailout policies rigorously and shows that even non-risky bubbles may be undesirable for taxpayers.