The Paradox of Pledgeability
The Paradox of Pledgeability
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可质押性的悖论
DOI：
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发表时间：
2017
影响因子：
8.9
通讯作者：
Giorgia Piacentino
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Donaldson;Denis Gromb;Giorgia Piacentino
我们开发了一个模型，在该模型中，抵押品用于保护债权人免受竞争债权人的索赔。我们发现，当现金流可抵押性高时，借款人最依赖抵押品，因为这是很容易承担新债务，稀释现有债权人的时候。因此，债权人需要抵押品以防止被稀释。这导致了抵押品的竞争，导致所有借款都被抵押。但抵押借款是有成本的：它使资产增值，限制了未来的借款和投资，也就是说，存在抵押品过剩。我们的研究结果表明，绝对优先权规则，即有担保债权人优先于无担保债权人，可能会产生不利影响-它可能会引发抵押品的老鼠赛跑。
We develop a model in which collateral serves to protect creditors from the claims of competing creditors. We find that borrowers rely most on collateral when cash flow pledgeability is high, because this is when it is easy to take on new debt, diluting existing creditors. Creditors thus require collateral for protection against being diluted. This causes a collateral rat race that results in all borrowing being collateralized. But collateralized borrowing has a cost: it encumbers assets, constraining future borrowing and investment, i.e. there is a collateral overhang. Our results suggest that the absolute priority rule, by which secured creditors are senior to unsecured creditors, may have an adverse effect — it may trigger the collateral rat race.