Autism as mindblindness: an elaboration and partial defence
Autism as mindblindness: an elaboration and partial defence
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作为心盲的自闭症：详细阐述和部分辩护
DOI：
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发表时间：
1996
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
P. Carruthers
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
P. Carruthers
在本章中，我将为自闭症的心智盲视理论辩护，说明该理论如何能够容纳那些在其他情况下可能会对它产生疑问的数据，具体地说，我将说明该理论如何能够解释自闭症儿童很少进行自发的假装游戏这一事实，以及它如何能够解释作为自闭症特征的执行功能缺陷。为此，我强调了我所认为的心盲理论的一个推论，即自闭症受试者很难接近自己的心理状态，也很难接近他人的心理状态。
In this chapter I defend the mind-blindness theory of autism, by showing how it can accommodate data which might otherwise appear problematic for it. Specifically, I show how it can explain the fact that autistic children rarely engage in spontaneous pretend-play, and also how it can explain the executive-function deficits which are characteristic of the syndrome. I do this by emphasising what I take to be an entailment of the mind-blindness theory, that autistic subjects have difficulties of access to their own mental states, as well as to the mental states of other people.