Animal communication: insights from linguistic pragmatics
Animal communication: insights from linguistic pragmatics
复制标题
动物交流:语言语用学的见解
DOI:
10.1016/j.anbehav.2009.10.013
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发表时间:
2010
期刊:
影响因子:
2.5
通讯作者:
Scott-Phillips T
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Scott-Phillips T
What do animal signals mean? Rendall et al.(2009) recently argued that such a question is in fact ill posed. To accept the question as meaningful (no pun intended) depends, according to Rendall et al., upon the adoption of the conduit metaphor (Reddy 1979), in which information is seen as a concrete entity that is to be passed from signaller to receiver. Certainly, this idea has intuitive appeal, and it pervades the everyday language of communication (eg ‘get your message across’;‘send me your ideas’, etc., see Reddy 1979). As Rendall et al. observed, this perspective necessarily adopts (sometimes explicitly, sometimes not) the Shannon and Weaver model of communication (Shannon & Weaver 1949), in which messages are encoded, transmitted, and then decoded. Yet this is, according to Rendall et al., an inappropriate way in which to characterize animal communication. They suggest instead that animal communication is better considered as a process of influencing other organisms. Rendall et al. argued for this on the grounds that the conduit metaphor overlooks many important factors that shape signal design, including that it fails to capture the asymmetries between signaller and receiver that are an inherent part of communication.Rendall et al.’s reasoning is persuasive. However, they did not mention the most compelling argument in their favour: that influencing others is actually what it means to communicate (Maynard Smith & Harper 2003; Scott-Phillips 2008). Furthermore, any information transfer that does occur (in the sense that uncertainty is reduced, Shannon & Weaver 1949) is entirely dependent on what the animals are doing to one another (Scott-Phillips 2008). For example, when a vervet monkey, Chlorocebus aethiops, hears the alarm call for an eagle, uncertainty is reduced not just with respect to the presence or otherwise of an eagle, but also all of the following: that there is another member of its troop in the local vicinity; that the caller’s productive tools (its vocal tract, etc.) are in working order; that the monkey’s own receptive tools (its ears, etc.) are in working order; and so on. In fact, the amount of information contained in the signal is infinite: there are an infinite number of ways in which the world could change such that the vervet would no longer hear the alarm call in a normal way (an earthquake may occur; a meteor may hit the vervet; the laws of physics may suddenly change; and so on). Uncertainty about all of these events is reduced by the fact that the vervet has heard the alarm call in a normal way, meaning that an infinite amount of information is ‘transferred’. The difference between these events and the presence of the eagle is that the alarm call evolved to reduce uncertainty about the presence of eagles, but it did not evolve to reduce uncertainty about the other possibilities. Similarly, the vervet’s response (hiding in bushes) is an evolved reaction to the call. All of which means that even if we do wish to conceive of communication
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DOI:
--
发表时间:
1990
期刊:
影响因子:
--
作者:
M. Ryan
通讯作者:
M. Ryan
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2009
期刊:
影响因子:
--
作者:
R. Cann;Ruth Kempson;E. Gregoromichelaki
通讯作者:
E. Gregoromichelaki
DOI:
--
发表时间:
1990
期刊:
影响因子:
--
作者:
G. Lakoff
通讯作者:
G. Lakoff
影响因子:
3.4
作者:
Scott-Phillips, Thomas C.;Kirby, Simon;Ritchie, Graham R. S.
通讯作者:
Ritchie, Graham R. S.
影响因子:
2
作者:
J. Atlas
通讯作者:
J. Atlas