Disclosure Policy in a Mixed Market
Disclosure Policy in a Mixed Market
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DOI：
10.1080/09638180.2014.977801
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发表时间：
2014-10
影响因子：
3.3
通讯作者：
K. Matsui
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
K. Matsui
摘要 本文研究了国有企业（SOE）和股份公司竞争供应产品的混合双头垄断市场中私人信息的最优披露策略。我构建了一个模型，其中两家公司在数量或价格上竞争，不确定性与边际成本或市场需求相关。该模型根据竞争和不确定性的类型确定了构成完美贝叶斯均衡的最佳披露策略。在古诺竞争中，双方企业在成本不确定性下都披露信息，而在需求不确定性下只有国有企业或两家企业都不披露信息。或者，在伯特兰竞争中，只有股份公司在成本不确定或需求不确定的情况下披露信息。最近，发达国家要求国有企业与普通股份公司同等水平的信息披露标准。本文所述的调查结果警告说，国有企业的这种强制披露可能会引发股份公司的反应，使经济面临福利减少的风险。
Abstract This paper investigates the optimal disclosure strategy for private information in a mixed duopoly market, where a state-owned enterprise (SOE) and a joint-stock company compete to supply products. I construct a model where the two firms compete in either quantity or price, and uncertainty is associated with either marginal cost or market demand. The model identifies the optimal disclosure strategies that constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium by type of competition and uncertainty. In Cournot competition, both firms disclose information under cost uncertainty, while only the SOE or neither firm discloses information under demand uncertainty. Alternatively, in Bertrand competition, only the joint-stock company discloses information under cost uncertainty or demand uncertainty. Recently, developed countries have required the same level of disclosure standards for SOEs as for ordinary joint-stock companies. The findings described in this paper warn that such mandatory disclosure by SOEs can trigger a reaction by joint-stock companies, putting the economy at risk of a reduction in welfare.