Revealed Preference Axioms for Rational Choice
Revealed Preference Axioms for Rational Choice
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揭示理性选择的偏好公理
DOI：
10.2307/2233812
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发表时间：
1991
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Kunal Sengupta
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Taradas Bandyopadhyay;Kunal Sengupta
本文提供了当冷漠关系不一定具有传递性时理性选择的简单公理基础。利用显示偏好关系的概念，即只要在 y 可用的情况下选择 x，就会显示一个替代方案 x 比替代 y 更受青睐，本文建立了集合 A 中被拒绝的替代方案永远不会比 A 中的某个选定元素（或 A 的某个元素）更受青睐的要求，这相当于准传递（或非循环）合理化；即，是严格偏序（或子序）存在的充分必要条件；而集合 A 中至少一个选定元素始终严格显示优先于 A 的每个被拒绝的替代项的要求相当于伪及物合理化，即，是区间顺序存在的充分必要条件。版权所有 1991 英国皇家经济学会。
This paper provides a simple axiomatic foundation of rational choice when the indifference relation is not necessarily transitive. Utilizing a notion of revealed preference relation, which says that an alternative x is revealed preferred to an alternative y whenever x is chosen while y is available, this paper establishes that the requirement that a rejected alternative of a set A can never be revealed preferred to some chosen element of A (resp. some element of A) is equivalent to quasi-transitive (resp. acyclic) rationalization; i.e., is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a strict partial order (resp. a suborder); while the requirement that at least one of the chosen elements of a set A is always strictly revealed preferred to every rejected alternative of A is equivalent to pseudotransitive rationalization i.e., is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an interval order. Copyright 1991 by Royal Economic Society.