Endogenous Vertical Restraints in International Trade
Endogenous Vertical Restraints in International Trade
复制标题
国际贸易的内生纵向限制
DOI：
10.1016/j.euroecorev.2004.07.001
复制
发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Nicolas Schmitt
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
H. Raff;Nicolas Schmitt
本文研究了一个通过中介机构销售产品的国内外制造商之间的品牌间竞争。制造商提供给这些中间商的合同是内生的。在均衡状态下，合同可能会根据产品之间的可替代性程度以及贸易壁垒的透明度水平和程度，规定专属领土。贸易自由化通过降低壁垒或提高壁垒透明度，可能导致制造商使用环境贸易，从而以私人反竞争安排取代政府施加的壁垒。这种替代可能会减少竞争和福利，从而使竞争政策在更自由的贸易环境中发挥作用。
This paper examines interbrand competition between a domestic and a foreign manufacturer who market their products through intermediaries. The contracts manufacturers offer these intermediaries are endogenous. In equilibrium contracts may specify exclusive territories (ET), depending on the degree of substitutability between products and the level and degree of transparency of trade barriers. Trade liberalization, through lower or more transparent barriers, may lead manufacturers to use ET, thereby substituting private anti-competitive arrangements for government-imposed barriers. This substitution may decrease competition and welfare, and thus create a role for competition policy in a freer trade environment.