A dynamic game analysis of Internet services with network externalities
A dynamic game analysis of Internet services with network externalities
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DOI：
10.1007/s11238-019-09686-8
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发表时间：
2019-02
影响因子：
0.8
通讯作者：
Tatsuhiro Shichijo;Emiko Fukuda
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Tatsuhiro Shichijo;Emiko Fukuda
互联网服务，如评论网站、常见问题网站、在线拍卖网站、在线跳蚤市场和社交网络服务，对我们的日常生活至关重要。每一项互联网服务的目的都是促进具有共同兴趣、活动或商品的人们之间的信息交换。互联网服务提供商的目标是让其服务的用户通过其服务积极地进行通信。如果没有活动交互，服务就会被废弃。在本研究中，我们认为互联网服务具有网络外部性作为其主要特征，并将网络外部性（ISNE）作为一种动态博弈模型来模拟互联网服务中的用户行为。特别是，我们将ISNE用户的扩散过程建模为一个完全信息的无限视界广义博弈，其中：(1)每个用户可以选择是否在她/他的回合中使用ISNE； (2) ISNE的网络效应取决于每个参与者的行为历史。然后应用马尔可夫完美均衡分析如何增加活跃用户数量。给出了每个参与者都是活跃用户的状态是唯一马尔可夫完美均衡结果的充分必要条件。此外，我们提出了一种激励机制，使活跃用户数量稳步增长。
Internet services, such as review sites, FAQ sites, online auction sites, online flea markets, and social networking services, are essential to our daily lives. Each Internet service aims to promote information exchange among people who share common interests, activities, or goods. Internet service providers aim to have users of their services actively communicate through their services. Without active interaction, the service falls into disuse. In this study, we consider that an Internet service has a network externality as its main feature, and we model user behavior in the Internet service with network externality (ISNE) as a dynamic game. In particular, we model the diffusion process of users of an ISNE as an infinite-horizon extensive-form game of complete information in which: (1) each user can choose whether or not to use the ISNE in her/his turn and (2) the network effect of the ISNE depends on the history of each player’s actions. We then apply Markov perfect equilibrium to analyze how to increase the number of active users. We derive the necessary and sufficient condition under which the state in which every player is an active user is the unique Markov perfect equilibrium outcome. Moreover, we propose an incentive mechanism that enables the number of active users to increase steadily.