Reforming the Rules of the Parliamentary Game: Measuring and Explaining Changes in Parliamentary Rules in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland, 1945–2010
Reforming the Rules of the Parliamentary Game: Measuring and Explaining Changes in Parliamentary Rules in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland, 1945–2010
复制标题
改革议会游戏规则：衡量和解释 1945 年至 2010 年奥地利、德国和瑞士议会规则的变化
DOI：
10.1080/01402382.2011.591079
复制
发表时间：
2011
影响因子：
4.2
通讯作者：
M. Heller
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ulrich Sieberer;W. Müller;M. Heller
制度变迁的问题最近在比较政治学中受到越来越多的关注。尽管比较立法研究已经确定了议会规则对程序和产出的重要影响以及各国之间的巨大差异，但我们对这些规则的变化知之甚少。本文采取了几个步骤来描绘和解释欧洲议会的规则变化。从理论上讲，它勾勒了一个模型，解释这种变化的基础上的理性选择的概念，制度作为内生均衡。在方法上，它提出了两种互补的方法来衡量规则的变化。综合起来，这些措施使我们能够确定议会规则变化的内容、相关性和影响。从经验上讲，本文首次系统地分析了1945年以来奥地利、德国和瑞士议会议事规则的所有变化。这一分析表明，议会规则经常发生大规模变化。它还确定了国家和内容领域之间的差异，这些差异在很大程度上符合理论预期。
Questions of institutional change have recently received increased attention in comparative politics. Even though comparative legislative research has identified important effects of parliamentary rules on processes and outputs as well as large variation across countries, we know very little about changes in these rules. This article takes several steps towards mapping and explaining rule changes in European parliaments. Theoretically, it sketches a model explaining such changes based on the rational choice notion of institutions as endogenous equilibria. Methodologically, it proposes two complementary approaches to measure rule changes. In combination, these measures allow us to identify the content, relevance, and effects of changes in parliamentary rules. Empirically, the article provides the first systematic analysis of all changes in the parliamentary standing orders of Austria, Germany, and Switzerland since 1945. This analysis demonstrates that parliamentary rules are changed frequently and massively. It also identifies differences across countries and content areas that are largely in line with theoretical expectations.