Free Entry and Social Efficiency Under Vertical Oligopoly
Free Entry and Social Efficiency Under Vertical Oligopoly
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纵向寡头垄断下的自由进入与社会效率
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.632941
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发表时间：
2005
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
H. Morita
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. Ghosh;H. Morita
我们通过分析一个连续的垂直寡头垄断模型来分析自由进入的社会效率，该模型明确地包含了产业之间的垂直关系。我们证明，自由进入一个生产同类产品的行业可能会导致社会上的公司数量不足，而不是过多。这与之前在理论产业组织文献中的发现相反，后者发现，在古诺寡头垄断和固定启动成本的同质最终产品市场中，自由进入均衡的进入水平总是社会过度的。在我们的框架中，这一先前的发现是作为一种特殊情况出现的，即下游或上游部门没有市场力量。人们经常争辩说，这一标准结果可以为明显反竞争的进入规则提供理由。我们不充分的输入结果表明，当考虑到垂直关系时，这样的理由不一定有效。这产生了一个重要的政策含义，因为准入规定往往是对生产相对同质中间产品的行业实施的。
We offer a new perspective on social efficiency of free entry through analyzing a successive vertical oligopoly model that explicitly incorporates vertical relationships between industries. We demonstrate that free entry in an industry that produces a homogeneous product can lead to a socially insufficient, rather than excessive, number of firms. This is in contrast to the previous findings in the theoretical industrial organization literature, which found that, in homogeneous final-product markets with Cournot oligopoly and fixed set-up costs, level of entry in the free-entry equilibrium is always socially excessive. In our framework, this previous finding arises as a special case where the downstream or the upstream sector has no market power. It has often been argued that this standard result can provide a justification for apparently anticompetitive entry regulations. Our insufficient entry result indicates that such a justification is not necessarily valid, when vertical relationships are taken into account. This yields an important policy implication, given that entry regulations have often been imposed on industries that produce relatively homogeneous intermediate products.