The Institutional Power of Western European Parliaments: A Multidimensional Analysis

The Institutional Power of Western European Parliaments: A Multidimensional Analysis
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西欧议会的制度权力:多维分析

DOI:
10.1080/01402382.2011.572389
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发表时间:
2011
影响因子:
4.2
通讯作者:
Ulrich Sieberer
Ulrich Sieberer
中科院分区:
法学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Ulrich Sieberer

文献摘要

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议会不仅仅是立法机构。然而,我们对议会活动或议会职能的不同方面之间的理论关系缺乏足够的理解。基于委托代理框架,本文从理论上论证了议会权力是一个多维的概念,包括三个不同的机制,以确保政策输出符合议会的集体偏好:对决策的直接影响、外部官员的事前选择和内阁的事后控制。这些机制反映了议会的经典立法、选举和控制职能。实证研究表明,西欧15个议会的制度性权力由四个不同维度构成,分别是新制定的选举权指标和既定的立法和控制资源指标。这些维度与三个理论派生的机制相匹配,委员会权力是一个额外的因素。在议会权力的这一多维空间中确定15个议会的位置表明,单纯基于立法的分类导致对议会强弱的偏见评估。相反,该文件提供了西欧议会在授权条件下影响决策的方式的更微妙的图景。
Parliaments are more than legislative bodies. However, we lack an adequate understanding of the theoretical relationship between different facets of parliamentary activity or ‘parliamentary functions’. Relying on the principal–agent framework, this article argues theoretically that parliamentary power is a multidimensional concept comprising three distinct mechanisms to ensure policy outputs in line with the collective preferences of parliaments: direct influence on policymaking, the ex ante selection of external officeholders, and the ex post control of the cabinet. These mechanisms mirror the classic legislative, electoral, and control functions of parliaments. Empirically, the paper uses factor analysis of newly developed indicators for electoral powers and established measures of legislative and control resources to show that the institutional powers of 15 Western European parliaments comprise four distinct dimensions. These dimensions match the three theoretically derived mechanisms with committee power as an additional factor. Locating the 15 parliaments in this multidimensional space of parliamentary powers demonstrates that classifications based solely on lawmaking lead to biased assessments of parliamentary strength and weakness. Instead, the paper provides a more nuanced picture of the ways in which Western European parliaments can influence policymaking under the conditions of delegation.