Stability and diversity in collective adaptation
Stability and diversity in collective adaptation
复制标题
DOI：
10.1016/j.physd.2005.06.031
复制
发表时间：
2005-10-01
影响因子：
4
通讯作者：
Crutchfield, JP
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Sato, Y;Akiyama, E;Crutchfield, JP
我们从一个离散时间的随机微观模型出发，导出了一类描述集体适应的宏观微分方程。每个代理的行为是在局部实现最佳动作的适应和导致随机行为的记忆损失之间的动态平衡。我们发现，尽管个体代理以纯粹的自利方式与他们的环境和其他代理进行交互，但宏观行为可以被解释为博弈动力学。对几个常见的显性游戏交互的应用表明，适应动力学表现出集体行为的多样性。宏观方程基础假设的简单性表明，这些行为在集体适应中应该被广泛预期。我们还从信息论的角度分析了适应动态，并讨论了由不确定性动态引起的自组织，给出了集体适应的一个新视角。(C)2005 Elsevier B.V.保留所有权利。
We derive a class of macroscopic differential equations that describe collective adaptation, starting from a discrete-time stochastic microscopic model. The behavior of each agent is a dynamic balance between adaptation that locally achieves the best action and memory loss that leads to randomized behavior. We show that, although individual agents interact with their environment and other agents in a purely self-interested way, macroscopic behavior can be interpreted as game dynamics. Application to several familiar, explicit game interactions shows that the adaptation dynamics exhibits a diversity of collective behaviors. The simplicity of the assumptions underlying the macroscopic equations suggests that these behaviors should be expected broadly in collective adaptation. We also analyze the adaptation dynamics from an information-theoretic viewpoint and discuss self-organization induced by the dynamics of uncertainty, giving a novel view of collective adaptation. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.