Endogenous Parliaments: The Domestic and International Roots of Long-Term Economic Growth and Executive Constraints in Europe
Endogenous Parliaments: The Domestic and International Roots of Long-Term Economic Growth and Executive Constraints in Europe
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内生议会：欧洲长期经济增长和行政约束的国内和国际根源
作者：
Scott F. Abramson;C. Boix
摘要行政行为的制度约束被普遍认为是限制国家征用、保护财产权、促进经济发展的重要宪法特征。结合新的数据描述议会的限制，为整个欧洲大陆的城市规模的数据的存在，我们建立在内生经济增长的理论，以证明在欧洲历史的漫长跨度从1200年到1900年的经济和政治发展的道路是一个共同的过程的城市群的结果。在这样做的过程中，我们提供的证据表明，这两个结果限制制度和增长的存在是由初始条件，促进技术诀窍体现在城市居住的工匠，反过来，谁能够强制制度限制统治者的行动。因此，议会限制本身不是反映发展的真正根本原因，而是由内生增长进程决定的结果。
Abstract Institutional constraints on executive behavior are commonly understood to be crucial constitutional features that limit state expropriation, protect property rights, and promote economic development. Combining new data describing the presence of parliamentary constraints for the entire European continent with data on city sizes, we build upon theories of endogenous economic growth to demonstrate that paths of both economic and political development over the long span of European history from 1200 to 1900 are the consequence of a common process of urban agglomeration. In doing so, we provide evidence that both outcomes—the existence of constraining institutions and growth—are driven by initial conditions that fostered technical know-how embodied in urban-dwelling artisans who, in turn, were able to force institutional limits on rulers’ actions. Hence, instead of reflecting a true underlying cause of development, parliamentary constraints are themselves outcomes determined by an endogenous process of growth.