Truthful Incentive Mechanisms for Social Cost Minimization in Mobile Crowdsourcing Systems.
Truthful Incentive Mechanisms for Social Cost Minimization in Mobile Crowdsourcing Systems.
复制标题
移动众包系统社会成本最小化的真实激励机制
DOI：
10.3390/s16040481
复制
发表时间：
2016-04-06
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Li Y
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Duan Z;Yan M;Cai Z;Wang X;Han M;Li Y
随着新技术的出现，移动设备能够承担计算和传感任务。拥有这些移动设备的大量用户推动了移动众包系统(MCSs)的形成。在MCS内，每个移动设备都可以为众包平台做出贡献，并从中获得回报。为了获得更好的性能，重要的是设计一种机制，能够吸引足够多的移动设备参与者，然后在参与者之间高效地分配任务。本文主要研究多智能体系统中的任务分配和价格确定问题。针对不同的工作模式，提出了两种真实的拍卖机制。针对连续工作模式，提出了一种基于Vickrey-Clarke-Groves(VCG)的拍卖机制；对于非连续工作模式，提出了一种次优拍卖机制。进一步的分析表明，该机制具有个体理性和计算效率的特点。实验结果表明，这两种机制都能保证所有移动用户以真实的价值进行竞价，并且基于VCG的拍卖机制可以获得最优的最大社会成本。
With the emergence of new technologies, mobile devices are capable of undertaking computational and sensing tasks. A large number of users with these mobile devices promote the formation of the Mobile Crowdsourcing Systems (MCSs). Within a MCS, each mobile device can contribute to the crowdsourcing platform and get rewards from it. In order to achieve better performance, it is important to design a mechanism that can attract enough participants with mobile devices and then allocate the tasks among participants efficiently. In this paper, we are interested in the investigation of tasks allocation and price determination in MCSs. Two truthful auction mechanisms are proposed for different working patterns. A Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG)-based auction mechanism is proposed to the continuous working pattern, and a suboptimal auction mechanism is introduced for the discontinuous working pattern. Further analysis shows that the proposed mechanisms have the properties of individual rationality and computational efficiencies. Experimental results suggest that both mechanisms guarantee all the mobile users bidding with their truthful values and the optimal maximal social cost can be achieved in the VCG-based auction mechanism.